Continued from: František Palacký (1798-1876): Early Years
"Assuredly, if the Austrian State had
not existed for ages, in the interests of Europe and indeed of humanity itself
we would have to endeavor to create it as soon as possible."
František Palacký — 1848
This quote
is from a letter František Palacký wrote in April 1848 declining an invitation
to join the Committee of Fifty, which was to participate in the All-German
Constituent Assembly. This letter highlights Palacký's belief in a union of
nation-states under the Austrian Empire's aegis with the very Romantic ideal of
political equality and religious freedom (Zacek 25).
This was
an ideal not based in reality. Austria was an authoritarian government and even
within Bohemia's governing diet all was not equal. The diets were made up of
representatives from all the estates: prelates, lords, knights, and cities. The
voting process weighed against the cities so the aristocratic classes of
prelates, lords, and knights were favored (Pech 9). Palacký's idealism and
belief in a historic destiny for Austria would be, as we shall see, shaken by
the reality of the compromises the Habsburgs would later make to preserve the
integrity of their empire at the cost of the Czech aspirations.
At this
time, the lands ruled over by the Austrian Habsburg Emperor Ferdinand I and his
Chancellor Prince Metternich were organized along a highly centralized
administration. To minimize local control of regional government a province
would have a diet to represent the people. There were, however, no central
governing groups at the larger state level. In the United States, this is akin
to a local county (or province) retaining its legislature, but no longer having
a senate or assembly at the state level. The counties therefore are directly
beholden to the federal government with shorter reigns to control them. In
reality, these provincial diets were largely ineffective, serving mainly to
"rubberstamp" the emperor's orders (Pech 9).
Prague,
being something of a gathering point for many Slavs, was the natural choice for
the Congress to take place. Palacký became president of the Congress and
invitations were made in a variety of languages spoken by the Slavs; Czech,
Slovak, Slovene, Croatian, Serbian, Polish, German and French (Pech 124).
Notably, Russian Slavs were not invited. While it was contemplated, no invitation
was ever issued. The irony of a pan-Slavic meeting without representatives from
one of the largest Slavic populations apparently did not seem to bother many of
the leaders. Mikhail Bakunin, the Russian Revolutionary and a cleric,
Miloradov, from Bukovina did attend, but as one of the delegates representing
the Polish-Ruthenian interests (Pech 129). This only managed to draw more
criticism to the congress, and Palacký himself was not pleased with Bakunin's
presence.
Although
the Poles and Czechs had common ground regarding their feelings about Germany,
they were at odds over the Magyars, who the Czechs resented, but the Poles
counted as friends. The Poles regarded the Austrians with hostility as, along
with Germany and Russia, they sought to control Poland. Meanwhile, the Czechs
courted Austria with Palacký’s vision of a federation.
The
Congress would deal with Slavic interests by sections, with each section
choosing a leader. Pavel Safarik, Palacký’s old friend, headed the Czech and
Slovak section. Karol Libelt led the Poles and Ruthenians and Pavao Starnatovic
led the South Slavs. There were 340 delegates in all with 500 official guests
(Orton).
Four issues dominated the agenda for the 1848 Congress:
I. The
relationship between Austrian Slavs, particularly as it
applies to a Slavic
association for mutual
defense.
2. The
relationship of the Austrian Slavs to the other peoples
of the monarchy.
3. The
relationship of the Austrian Slavs with other Slavs.
4. The
relationship of Austrian Slavs to other European
nations.
(Pech
125-126)
According
to the agenda, the congress was not so much about the Slavic peoples in general
as it was about Austrian Slavs in particular. Although other Slavic peoples
would be discussed, in addition to other European nations, this particular
Pan-Slavic Congress had a very narrow focus.
By referring
to themselves as "Austrian Slavs" rather than Czechs, while
technically correct, is an obvious sign the leaders of the congress were
playing down nationalist element, particularly since the permission of the
Austrian government was needed just to be able to assemble. Nevertheless, it is
also indicative of Palacký’s vision to establish a federation of autonomous
nation-states within the Austrian Empire, rather than apart from it.
This
vision conflicted with the aspirations of other Slavic peoples attending the
congress. The Poles, for example, knew what it was like to have their own nation
and dreamed of getting it back again someday. Palacký, the middle-class son of
a cleric who courted the patronage of the upper classes, was not particularly
anti-authoritarian in his attitudes. His plan for federalized Austrian rule suggests
that at this time he wished to work with the Austrians, not against them. Palacký
at that time also saw the Germans as the main opponent to Czech nationalist
aspirations, so it is not surprising that he would seek favor with the
Austrians under these conditions.
Ethnic groups of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. |
Palacký was
now entering the height of his early influence as a national figure. Count
Thun, the Governor of Bohemia, made Palacký a member of an eight-man
provisional executive council and appointed him to draft a constitution for a
constituent assembly to be held in July (Zacek 26). This was to counter the
All-German Constituent Assembly in Frankfurt in 1848; however, the riots that
erupted in other parts of Europe soon came to Prague by mid-June. With the
country under martial law, Palacký went to the constituent assembly held in
Vienna that July. His plan to federalize the multi-national empire around a
strong central government was discarded (Zacek 26).
The idea
of a central government is telling of the limits of Palacky's nationalist
vision. Indeed, it gives insight into the statement he made in response to the
invitation to the All-German Constituent Assembly earlier in the year.
"Assuredly, if the Austrian State had
not existed for ages, in the interests of Europe and indeed of humanity itself
we would have to endeavor to create it as soon as possible." (Zacek
25)
The
Aftermath of 1848
As soon as
Palacký's entered the political arena his political fortunes began to change.
Count Thun, who appointed Palacký to the provisional executive council, was
relieved of his duties as governor, having incurred the disfavor of both the
Czechs and the Austrians (Pech 165). Palacký himself would also feel the
displeasure of both the Austrians and the Bohemian Estates. His proposal for
the federalization of Austria decentralized the power of the crown and
compromised the historical feudal rights to the land of the Estates (Perman
10).
In
reaction to the upset caused by the revolutions of 1848, Austria responded with
an assertion of absolutist rule. From 1851 to 1860, Palacký was "exiled
from the press of national life" (Zacek 26). Watched by the police, in
danger of being arrested and jailed, and abandoned by friends, Palacký withdrew
from his family and continued writing his History
of Bohemia. Harrison Thompson asserts in his 1953 book, Czechoslovakia in European History, that Palacký
was not given permission to enter Prague to be with his wife on her deathbed
(Thomson 212); however, Joseph F. Zacek, author of Palacký: The Historian as Scholar and Nationalist (1970), in a
personal interview with myself, disagrees with Thomson on this point.
By 1860,
Emperor Franz Josef decided that the course of absolutism taken over the past
ten years had not been a great success. This was due in part to the great
opposition to it voiced by his opponents. In response, the emperor issued a
proclamation that the government would return to a "constitutional
system" (Thomson 212). On the twentieth of October, 1860, the so-called October Diploma created a federal
constitution, despite the opposition of the Hungarians (Burne 932). The February Patent of 1861 sought to
assuage Magyar fears by granting a number of concessions. These, however, were
rejected by the Hungarian Diet (Thomson 213). This set in motion the series of
events that led to the creation of the Dual Monarchy and great disillusionment
by Palacký.
In 1861, Palacký
began to appear on the political scene again. In April of that year, he became
a life member of the Lords of the Imperial Diet, but felt "isolated and
ineffectual." He quit the Imperial Diet in September and soon joined the
Bohemian Diet as leader of the National Party in the Bohemian Diet (with his
son-in-law František Rieger) also known as the "Old Czechs" (Zacek
27). Events throughout the early to mid-1860s were unfavorable to Austra and
would precipitate the Ausgleich of
1867.
The
Ausgleich of 1867
Austria's
loss in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 put the Hungarian’s position to press
their nationalist aspirations. The Ausgleich (Compromise) granted Hungarian
autonomy on a theoretically equal level to Austria with the concept of the
"Dual Monarchy" (Zacek 27).
Emperor Franz Josef, who suffered the loss of prestige by losing the war
in 1866, followed by the "Compromise" granting Magyar autonomy in
1867, was in no mood to listen to Czech claims to restore the Bohemian Kingdom
to the same level the Hungarians recently been given (Thomson 214).
While the
debate over the Ausgleich continued, Palacký was forced to address his feeling
towards Austria as a "political necessity" (Thomson 214). He set his
feelings down in a number of articles that would be published in book form and
title, The Idea of the Austrian State.
In this volume, Palacký slowly began to change his view towards Austria as a
venue for Czech nationalist aspirations, but he still had the dreams of an
idealist:
"I have always hoped that Austria would
have a government that was neither German nor Magyar nor Slav nor Romanian, but
only Austrian . . . I mean a government which would be equally just for all under its
jurisdiction." (Thomson 215)
Palacký reaches
an inevitable conclusion; the dual-monarchy would exacerbate the worst elements
of Habsburg rule. Not only was the idea of a federalized Austrian government
rejected, but national rule was completely ruled out as well. Palacky responded
with a resilient call at the end of The
Idea of the Austrian State:
"The day of the declaration of dualism
will . . . be the birthday of Pan-Slavism in its least desirable form . . . We were in
existence before Austria and we will still be here after she is gone.” (Thomson
215)
For
another generation, these words would be on the lips of Czech nationalists.
They would also turn out to be very prophetic, for little could Palacký know
that the Czechoslovak nation would rise from the ashes of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire.
In
response to the Ausgleich in May 1867, Palacký led a delegation to Moscow to
the All-Slav Ethnographic Exhibition (Zacek 27). His intention had been to stir
Pan-Slavic interest among the Russians, but he had no success and became
disillusioned with them as well (Thomson 216). In 1869, Palacký‘s son-in-law, Rieger,
tried to interest Napoleon III in the federalized version of the Austrian
Empire to counter Prussia (soon to become part of a unified Germany). Unfortunately,
this effort just invited more persecution from the Habsburg court as political
imprisonment and a curtailment of civic liberties soon followed. In short
order, Italy and Germany were unified, Hungary was elevated to an equal level
with the Austrian crown, and the dreams of federalization were gone.
Palacký,
who died in 1876, spent these remaining years contemplating his life's work and
the future of his people. In the end, he acknowledged the mistake he made supporting
the Habsburg Empire earlier in his life. He saw a "new Thirty Years'
War" in the Czech future (Zacek 27); World War I would be that war and the
result was Czech nationhood with their Slovak neighbors.
Legacy
"History
in general is the final temporal
judgment over those who distinguish
themselves by their activities on the world-stage, a human judgment,
of course, and therefore neither infallible, nor sufficiently competent . . . "
František
Palacký (Zacek 27)
Here, Palacký is voicing his awareness of the role he had played in recent nationalist history. He also seems to be "hedging his bets," so to speak, in case history had a less
than favorable view of him. His life's
great work, The History of Bohemia,
was finally brought
to a finish during these final years. Palacký‘s level of scholarship and dedication to his craft would have an impact on Czech historiography and his words would influence a new generation of Czechs who would live to see their national
aspirations brought to fruition. These new Czech leaders,
the "Young Czechs," saw their opportunities for power first manifest after the failure of the attempts by the "Old
Czechs" to bring their plans for federalization into existence (Thomson 221).
Thomas Garrigue Masaryk (1850-1937), first President
of the Czechoslovak nation, was a self-proclaimed "disciple" of Palacký
who studied Palacký’s philosophy of history. Rather than study the significance of Czech history
for the Czech, Masaryk also took it to the next
level by exploring the implications of Czech history to the rest
of the world (Zacek 105). Masaryk's
marriage to an American woman brought a wider variety of English and American
ideas on philosophy and politics to influence his thinking. Masaryk' synthesis
of these ideas, as well as being able to see the larger implications of Czech
history, made him an apt and formidable choice for first president of the
Czechoslovak nation.
Palacký’s History of Bohemia, was more of a Czech history than a history of all
the people who lived in Bohemia. The Sudeten Germans picked this up
immediately. This lack of inclusiveness exposes a bias on Palacký’s part and left him open to
criticism. By the last 1930s, the problem of the Sudentenland gave Adolf Hitler
the opportunity for conquest. Palacký’s legacy was now in full flight;
monuments to his memory were removed, streets and places named in his honor
changed, and his books burned (Zacek 107).
Gradually,
in the latter half of the Twentieth Century, Palacký began receiving more
favorable attention. The Soviet’s, while not exactly appreciative of Palacký’s
feelings about Russia, did endorse his view regarding the German threat. Masaryk
helped the Czech see the larger implications of Palacký writings. True, Palacký’s
life did experience numerous political failures: the failure of his repeated
attempts to put forth his federalization plan for Austria, the failures of l848,
his "internal exile" in the 1850's, his disillusionment with Austro-Hungarian
Dualism, his experience with the Russians, the many years wasted courting
Austrian favor that never manifested.
In many
ways, Palacký’s failures were inevitable; the times he lived in were just not
the right for the political manifestation of Czech independence. It was too
soon, the leadership needed to run a modern nation-state was just not available.
If Palacký had been more militant in 1848 and advocated open revolution, the Czech
people would have suffered more and Palacký’s life much shorter.
Palacký’s
legacy is that he embraced the knowledge of his ancestor's to lead his people
into the birthright of nationhood. Like Moses, he never made it to the promise
land, but by showing his people where they came from — and by contributing to the
advancement of their culture — Palacký prepared his people for their future.
Related Content
Works Cited
Burne, Jerome, ed. Chronicle of the World. Paris: Jacques LeGrand
S.A. International Publishing, 1989. Print.
Orton, Lawrence. “Congress of the Slavs in Prague (1848).” James
Thomson, Harrison S. Czechoslovakia in European History.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953. Print.
Zacek, Joseph F. Palacký: The Historian as Scholar and Nationalist.
The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1970. Print.
---. Personal interview. 2 Dec. 1999.
Orton, Lawrence. “Congress of the Slavs in Prague (1848).” James
Chastain, ed. Encyclopedia
of 1848 Revolutions. Ohio
University, 1999. Web.
5 Oct. 1999. <http://www.ohiou.edu/
-chastain/ac/congslav.htm>.
Pech, Stanley Z. The Czech Revolution of 1848. Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1969. Print.
Perman, D. The
Shaping of the Czechoslovak State. Leiden: E.J.
Brill, 1962. Print.
Thomson, Harrison S. Czechoslovakia in European History.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953. Print.
Zacek, Joseph F. Palacký: The Historian as Scholar and Nationalist.
The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1970. Print.
---. Personal interview. 2 Dec. 1999.
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